A Kelsenian Critique of Justice as a Subjective Judgment and an Irrational Ideal

Scholars have long developed theories of justice along two dominant traditions: utilitarian and deontological. The utilitarian tradition maintains that justice is grounded in principles, rules, and institutions that are instrumental to achieving desirable outcomes, particularly the maximization of happiness. In contrast, the deontological tradition emphasizes that justice is rooted in strict moral duties that cannot be overridden, even in pursuit of beneficial consequences.
Beyond these positions, one of the most enduring conceptions of justice focuses on the nature of relationships among persons, particularly in ensuring balanced reciprocity. Within this framework, legal justice has been advanced as a mechanism for maintaining order and objectivity. Hans Kelsen strongly defends legal justice as objective, while critiquing alternative accounts of justice as subjective judgments.
This study interrogates Kelsen’s conceptualization of justice, particularly his claim regarding its objectivity, and examines the broader debate concerning whether justice is inherently subjective or an irrational ideal. Adopting a qualitative research design, the study employs expository and analytical methods to critically evaluate competing philosophical arguments.
Findings reveal that although conceptions of justice vary across individuals and contexts, justice itself is not an irrational ideal. Rather, it functions as a normative blueprint that guides human interaction, even if its practical realization differs in everyday life.
The study concludes that justice retains its philosophical relevance as an objective moral reference point, despite the diversity of subjective interpretations surrounding it.