



A Foucauldian Analysis of Power, Law, and the Construction of Justice

Abstract

The relationship between power and justice has long occupied a central position in legal and political philosophy, traditionally framed within assumptions of neutrality, fairness, and moral objectivity. However, this paper interrogated whether justice is indeed an independent normative ideal or whether it is fundamentally shaped by underlying structures of power. Drawing on the philosophical insights of Michel Foucault, the paper argued that justice is not autonomous but is constructed through historically contingent and institutionally mediated power relations. Through an analytical engagement with Foucault's concepts of power/knowledge, discipline, and the production of truth, the paper established how legal systems function not merely as neutral arbiters but as active places in the creation and reinforcement of normative orders. The paper defended the position that law operates as both an instrument and expression of power, thereby shaping what societies recognise as just. While engaging competing perspectives from Thomas Hobbes, John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and Lon L. Fuller, the study critically evaluated whether justice can resist power or merely be reconfigured within it. The findings showed that justice, rather than being eliminated, is continually reconstructed through dynamic power relations embedded in legal and social institutions. It concluded that the task of legal philosophy is not to detach justice from power but to interrogate and reshape the conditions under which justice is produced. The paper recommended a critical rethinking of legal neutrality, particularly in contemporary contexts marked by surveillance, governance complexities, and institutional authority, with specific relevance to developing democracies.

Keywords: Power, Justice, Law, Michel Foucault, political Philosophy.

Elijah O. Okpanachi PhD

Department of Philosophy,
Federal University of Lafia,
Lafia.

<https://orcid.org/0009-0004-6780-0165>
08037550889

Lubem Agishi

Department of General Studies,
Federal Polytechnic, Wannune.

Pro Bono Lecturer,

Department of Philosophy
Federal University of Lafia, Lafia

lubemagishi@fedpolywannune.edu.ng

lubemagishi@gmail.com

<https://orcid.org/0009-0006-2003-6715>

08070452224 | 08129838811

Corresponding Author's Email:

Eltonia4u@gmail.com

Date Received: 12th May, 2026

Date Accepted: 12th June, 2026

Introduction

Justice has historically been conceived as a moral ideal grounded in fairness, equality, and the proper ordering of society. From classical antiquity, philosophers such as Plato regarded justice as harmony within both

the individual and the state, a principle that ensures each part performs its appropriate function. Plato famously asserts that "justice is doing one's own work and not meddling with what is not one's own" (433a). This classical understanding establishes justice as a

normative standard against which power is to be judged, thereby suggesting a hierarchical relationship in which justice constrains power. Yet, this idealised separation between justice and power has been increasingly questioned within modern legal and political philosophy. Thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes challenge the independence of justice by grounding it in sovereign authority. Hobbes contends that “where there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice” (90), implying that justice is contingent upon the existence of power rather than preceding it. This position reorients the discourse by suggesting that justice does not regulate power but is instead a product of it, thereby complicating the classical assumption of justice as an external moral criterion.

The tension between these perspectives raises a fundamental philosophical problem which is whether justice an objective standard that limits power, or is it constructed within the very operations of power itself? This question becomes particularly significant within legal theory, where law is often presented as a neutral mechanism for the administration of justice. It is within this context that the work of Michel Foucault becomes particularly significant. Foucault rejects the notion of power as merely repressive or centralised, instead conceptualising it as diffuse, productive, and embedded within everyday practices and institutions. His analysis challenges the neutrality of justice by demonstrating how legal and social norms are

constituted through power relations. This paper, therefore, advances the thesis that justice is not an autonomous moral ideal but is historically and institutionally constructed through networks of power mediated by law.

Conceptual Clarifications

Power has often been narrowly interpreted within political and legal philosophy as the capacity to coerce or compel obedience. Classical theorists typically associated power with sovereignty, command, and domination. However, this understanding proves insufficient when examining the complexities of modern social and legal systems. Michel Foucault fundamentally redefines power by arguing that it is not merely repressive but productive, operating through diffuse networks rather than centralised authority. As he notes, “power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere” (Foucault, *History of Sexuality* 93).

This reconceptualisation shifts the analytical focus from power as possession to power as relation. Power, in this sense, is exercised rather than owned; it circulates through institutions, discourses, and practices. Such a view is particularly relevant to legal theory, where power is often institutionalised in the form of legal authority. The productive nature of power highlights its role in shaping what is considered true or legitimate. Through what Foucault terms the “power/knowledge” nexus, systems of knowledge, including legal doctrines, are

both products and instruments of power (Foucault, *Power/Knowledge* 27). This insight is crucial for understanding how legal definitions of justice emerge, not as objective truths, but as outcomes of historically situated power relations.

Justice has traditionally been conceived as a moral virtue grounded in fairness and equality. In classical philosophy, justice was often understood as an intrinsic good, independent of political contingencies. However, modern legal theory complicates this view by situating justice within institutional frameworks. John Rawls, for instance, defines justice as “the first virtue of social institutions” (Rawls 3), thereby emphasising its role in structuring legal and political arrangements. Rawls’ formulation attempts to preserve the moral autonomy of justice while acknowledging its institutional embodiment. His theory of “justice as fairness” posits that principles of justice are chosen under conditions of equality, thereby ensuring impartiality. This framework presupposes that justice can be abstracted from power relations, a presupposition that Foucault critically challenges. From a Foucauldian perspective, such neutrality is illusory, as the very conditions under which principles are formulated are themselves shaped by power. In contrast, Friedrich Nietzsche offers a more radical critique by associating justice with domination. Nietzsche argues that moral concepts, including justice, are expressions of the “will to power” (Nietzsche 211), thereby exposing their contingent and strategic

nature. While Nietzsche’s account differs from Foucault’s, both thinkers converge in rejecting the idea of justice as a fixed moral truth. Instead, justice is seen as historically contingent and shaped by struggles for power.

Law occupies a central position in the relationship between power and justice, serving as both a normative framework and an institutional apparatus. Traditionally, law has been understood as a system of rules designed to uphold justice and regulate social conduct. However, this formalist conception overlooks the ways in which law is embedded within broader power structures. Thomas Hobbes, for instance, defines law as the command of the sovereign, thereby grounding its authority in power (Hobbes 183). This command theory of law highlights the dependence of legal systems on political authority. Yet, it also raises critical questions about the legitimacy of law: if law derives its authority from power, can it still serve as an instrument of justice? This tension becomes more pronounced when considering the institutional dimensions of law. Courts, prisons, and enforcement agencies do not merely apply legal rules; they actively shape social norms and behaviours. Foucault’s analysis deepens this critique by demonstrating how legal institutions function as mechanisms of discipline and control. Law, in this sense, is not simply a reflection of justice but a tool for producing compliant subjects. This dual character of law, as both normative ideal and instrument of power, reveals the

complexity of the power-justice relationship.

The divergence between classical and contemporary accounts of power and justice highlights a significant conceptual gap. While Hobbes grounds justice in sovereign power and Rawls seeks to regulate power through principles of justice, Foucault disrupts this binary by demonstrating that power and justice are mutually constitutive. Justice is neither wholly independent of power nor entirely reducible to it; rather, it emerges within dynamic networks of power relations. This perspective has profound implications for legal philosophy. It challenges the assumption that law can function as a neutral arbiter of justice, instead revealing its role in constructing normative realities. By situating justice within the operations of power, Foucault provides a framework for critically analysing legal and political institutions. As such, the relationship between power and justice must be understood not as hierarchical but as deeply intertwined, with law serving as the primary medium through which this relationship is articulated.

Foucault's Analytics of Power

A striking historical illustration opens Foucault's analysis: the public execution of Robert-François Damiens in 1757, a spectacle of sovereign punishment marked by brutality and theatrical display. Rather than merely recounting an episode of violence, Michel Foucault uses this case to demonstrate a transformation in the nature of power, from visible,

sovereign force to subtle, disciplinary control (Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* 3-6). The public spectacle, he suggests, gives way over time to less visible yet more pervasive mechanisms of regulation, where power is exercised not through overt violence but through continuous observation and normalisation. This historical transition marks a fundamental shift in how power operates within legal systems. Whereas sovereign power relied on the right to take life or inflict punishment, modern disciplinary power functions through the regulation of bodies and behaviours. The implication is that, law no longer merely prohibits or punishes; it actively shapes individuals into compliant subjects. As Foucault observes, "the body becomes a useful force only if it is both a productive body and a subjected body" (Foucault *Discipline and Punish* 26). This statement is significant because it reveals that power produces subjects who internalise norms, thereby reducing the need for overt coercion. In this sense, justice cannot be understood apart from the disciplinary mechanisms that sustain it.

Contrary to traditional political theory, which locates power in sovereign authority or state institutions, Foucault advances a radically different conception. Power, he argues, operates at the micro-level of social relations, circulating through what he describes as "capillary" networks (Foucault, *Power/Knowledge* 39). This metaphor suggests that power flows through the smallest units of society, shaping interactions, behaviours, and perceptions in ways that are often

imperceptible. Such a conception challenges the legal assumption that power is exercised primarily through formal institutions such as courts and legislatures. Instead, power is embedded in everyday practices, including education, medicine, and administrative systems.

For example, the classification of individuals as “normal” or “deviant” is not merely a descriptive act but a normative one, reinforced by legal and institutional frameworks. In this regard, law functions as one node within a broader network of power relations, rather than as an autonomous arbiter of justice. An analytical comparison may be drawn with Thomas Hobbes, whose model of power is centralised and hierarchical. While Hobbes locates power in the sovereign who enforces law, Foucault disperses power across social institutions and practices. This shift has profound implications: if power is everywhere, then justice cannot be insulated from it. Rather, justice becomes one of the many effects produced by the operation of power.

The Power/Knowledge Nexus

Consider the role of expert knowledge in modern legal systems, medical reports, psychological evaluations, and forensic analyses often determine legal outcomes. Foucault interprets this phenomenon through the concept of the power/knowledge nexus, arguing that knowledge is both shaped by and constitutive of power (Foucault, *Power/Knowledge* 52). This relationship

implies that what is accepted as “truth” is not independent of power structures but is produced within them. Foucault’s assertion that “power produces knowledge... power and knowledge directly imply one another” (Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 27) is particularly instructive.

The claim should not be read as a denial of truth but as a critique of the conditions under which truth is established. In legal contexts, this means that judicial decisions are not based solely on objective facts but are influenced by institutional frameworks that define what counts as evidence and credibility. Thus, legal “truth” is constructed through processes that are deeply embedded in power relations. This can be seen in how Foucault consistently ties epistemology to power structures (Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* 27; *Power/Knowledge* 52). The implication for justice is significant: if truth itself is shaped by power, then justice, which relies on truth, is likewise contingent.

Beyond Sovereignty

A conceptual shift becomes evident when one examines Foucault’s critique of traditional sovereignty-based theories. Rather than viewing power as emanating from a central authority, Foucault argues that power is relational and exercised through a multiplicity of forces. This perspective undermines the legal fiction of a neutral, central authority administering justice. To illustrate, consider the operation of modern bureaucratic institutions. These

institutions do not rely solely on commands from a sovereign but function through procedures, classifications, and regulations that shape behaviour. Foucault describes this as a form of “disciplinary power” that operates through surveillance and normalisation (Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* 170-177).

The panopticon, as conceptualised by Jeremy Bentham and analysed by Foucault, serves as a metaphor for this form of power, where individuals internalise surveillance and regulate themselves accordingly. This analysis reveals that power is most effective when it is least visible. Unlike sovereign power, which asserts itself through force, disciplinary power operates by shaping desires, habits, and perceptions. Consequently, justice cannot be understood as an external standard imposed on power; rather, it is constituted within the very mechanisms through which power operates.

Legal Systems as Sites of Power Production

A practical observation from contemporary legal systems reinforces Foucault’s thesis as legal institutions do not merely apply laws but actively produce social realities. Courts, for instance, do more than adjudicate disputes; they define categories such as guilt, responsibility, and normality. These categories, in turn, shape societal perceptions of justice. Foucault’s insight that “the judges of normality are present everywhere” (Foucault *Discipline and Punish* 304) stresses the pervasive nature

of disciplinary power. This statement suggests that the authority to define norms extends beyond formal legal institutions to include a wide range of social actors. The implication is that justice is not solely determined within courtrooms but is continuously constructed through various institutional practices. From this standpoint, law emerges as both an instrument and an effect of power. It enforces norms while simultaneously being shaped by the very power relations it seeks to regulate. This dual character challenges the conventional view of law as a neutral framework for achieving justice, revealing instead its role in the ongoing production of normative order.

Law as an Instrument and Expression of Power

A courtroom proceeding often appears as the epitome of neutrality: a judge presides impartially, evidence is weighed objectively, and justice is delivered in accordance with established law. Yet, a closer examination reveals a more complex reality. The procedures governing admissibility of evidence, the authority of legal language, and the hierarchical structure of the courtroom all point to an underlying framework of power. Michel Foucault suggests that, such institutions are not merely venues for justice but are deeply embedded in networks of power that shape outcomes (Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 184-194). Here, there is invitation for a reconsideration of law itself. Rather than viewing law as an external standard

applied to social life, it becomes necessary to understand law as constitutive of social relations. The courtroom, in this sense, functions not only as a site of adjudication but also as a mechanism for producing authoritative truths. Legal judgments, therefore, are not simply discoveries of justice but constructions shaped by institutional power.

A definitional approach to law often emphasises its normative character, rules that guide behaviour and resolve disputes. However, Foucault's analysis reveals that law also operates as a disciplinary mechanism. The shift from corporal punishment to incarceration, for instance, reflects a transformation in how power is exercised within legal systems. Punishment is no longer primarily about retribution but about regulation and correction (Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 231). This transformation aligns with the emergence of what Foucault terms "disciplinary society," where institutions such as prisons, schools, and hospitals work together to normalise behaviour. The prison, in particular, becomes a central site for the exercise of power, not merely confining individuals but reshaping their identities. As Foucault observes, "the prison functions as an apparatus of knowledge" (Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 252), producing classifications and categories that define deviance and conformity. Scholars such as David Garland extend this analysis by arguing that modern penal systems reflect broader social anxieties about control and order (Garland 28). Garland's interpretation reinforces the view that law

is not isolated from society but is deeply intertwined with social power structures, this interplay is evident in how penal institutions embody both legal authority and social control (Garland 28; Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* 252).

Consider the process through which laws are created and enforced. Legislatures enact statutes, courts interpret them, and enforcement agencies implement them. At each stage, decisions are influenced by political, social, and economic considerations. Karl Marx famously argued that law reflects the interests of the ruling class, serving as a tool for maintaining existing power structures (Marx and Engels 64). While Marx's analysis emphasises economic power, Foucault broadens the scope to include a wider range of power relations. Law, in this expanded view, does not merely reflect dominant interests but actively shapes social norms. The concept of legality itself becomes a means of distinguishing acceptable behaviour from deviance, thereby reinforcing social order. An additional view is offered by Max Weber, who links legal authority to legitimacy. Weber identifies rational-legal authority as a defining feature of modern societies, where obedience is based on belief in the legality of enacted rules (Weber 215). However, Foucault's critique suggests that such legitimacy is itself produced through power relations, rather than existing independently of them. Thus, the authority of law is not merely accepted but constructed.

A contemporary illustration of law as an expression of power can be found in

surveillance practices. Modern policing increasingly relies on technologies that monitor behaviour, collect data, and predict potential threats. These practices extend the reach of legal power beyond traditional boundaries, embedding it within everyday life. Foucault's analysis of the panopticon provides a theoretical framework for understanding this phenomenon. He describes it as a system in which individuals internalise surveillance, leading them to regulate their own behaviour (Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 201). The significance of this model lies in its efficiency: power is exercised without the need for constant intervention. Building on this, Giorgio Agamben argues that modern states increasingly operate through states of exception, where legal norms are suspended in the name of security (Agamben 15). This development highlights the fluidity of legal boundaries and the capacity of power to redefine the scope of justice. These analyses collectively demonstrate that legal systems are not static but evolve in response to changing configurations of power (Foucault *Discipline and Punish* 201; Agamben 15). The implication is that justice, as mediated through law, is similarly dynamic. Taken together, these perspectives reinforce the argument that law is not a passive instrument but a useful tool in the production of justice. Justice, therefore, cannot be understood independently of the legal structures that define and enforce it.

The Construction of Justice

One may begin not with an abstract definition but with a practical observation: what counts as "just" varies significantly across societies, legal systems, and historical periods. Practices once considered just, public executions, colonial legal hierarchies, or discriminatory laws, are now widely condemned. This variability raises a critical question: is justice a fixed moral ideal, or is it constructed within shifting configurations of power? Michel Foucault answers by situating justice within historically contingent power relations, arguing that norms emerge through institutional practices rather than universal principles (Foucault *Power/Knowledge* 131). From this standpoint, justice is not discovered but produced. It is the outcome of discursive formations, legal, political, and social, that define what is acceptable, legitimate, and true. This position challenges the classical assumption that justice exists independently of power. Instead, justice becomes intelligible only within the frameworks that power establishes.

Niccolò Machiavelli, writing in the context of political instability, places the survival of the state above conventional moral considerations. In *The Prince*, he famously advises that a ruler must learn "how not to be good" when circumstances demand it (Machiavelli 61). This assertion does not merely reject morality; it redefines justice in terms of political necessity. Machiavelli's position can be interpreted as an early articulation of the idea that power precedes justice.

For him, justice is meaningful only insofar as it contributes to the stability and security of the state. Thus, acts that might traditionally be considered unjust may become justified if they serve political ends. In this sense, Machiavelli anticipates the Foucauldian insight that norms are shaped by practical exigencies rather than abstract ideals. However, Machiavelli differs from Foucault in one crucial respect. While Machiavelli openly endorses the strategic use of power, Foucault seeks to expose the subtle mechanisms through which power operates.

Justice as Legitimacy

A political leader addressing the public rarely invokes power in its raw form; instead, appeals are made to justice, fairness, and legitimacy. This observation underscores an important dimension of justice: its performative character. Justice must not only exist but must be seen to exist. Machiavelli notes that, “men in general judge more by the eye than by the hand” (Machiavelli 70), suggesting that the appearance of justice is often more politically significant than its substance. Foucault deepens this insight by demonstrating how legitimacy is produced through institutional practices. Courts, for example, operate according to procedures that convey impartiality, thereby reinforcing public trust. Yet, these procedures are themselves products of power relations. Jürgen Habermas offers a contrasting view, arguing that legitimacy arises from rational discourse and communicative action (Habermas

107). The tension between these perspectives is instructive. While Habermas emphasises the possibility of rational consensus, Foucault highlights the constraints imposed by power. From a Foucauldian perspective, even discourse is shaped by underlying power structures, limiting the extent to which justice can be genuinely neutral.

A sociological lens further clarifies the function of justice under power. Legal systems do not merely resolve disputes; they organise society by establishing norms and expectations. Émile Durkheim argues that law reflects the moral structure of society, distinguishing between acceptable and deviant behaviour (Durkheim 68). Foucault, however, extends this analysis by showing that law does not simply reflect social norms but actively produces them. The classification of individuals as “criminal,” “insane,” or “normal” is not a neutral act but a form of power that shapes identities. This process reveals that justice functions as a regulatory ideal, one that guides behaviour while reinforcing existing power structures. Antonio Gramsci (145) adds another dimension by introducing the concept of hegemony, where power is maintained not only through coercion but through consent. Justice, in this framework, becomes a means of securing consent, presenting existing arrangements as natural and legitimate.

At this stage, the central question becomes unavoidable: if justice is constructed through power, does it lose its normative significance? One possible

interpretation is that justice is merely an illusion, a rhetorical tool used to mask domination. This view finds support in Nietzsche's claim that moral concepts are expressions of the will to power (Nietzsche 211). Yet, such a conclusion may be overly reductive. Even if justice is shaped by power, it continues to play a crucial role in social organisation. Legal systems rely on the concept of justice to maintain order and legitimacy. Without it, power would appear arbitrary, undermining stability. In this sense, justice functions as a necessary construct, one that both reflects and sustains power relations. Foucault himself does not dismiss justice outright but encourages critical engagement with its underlying conditions. His analysis suggests that while justice cannot be separated from power, it can be reconfigured through changes in power relations. This position allows for the possibility of critique and transformation, even within a framework that acknowledges the pervasive influence of power.

Synthesis: Justice Under Power

Bringing these perspectives together, a clearer answer emerges: justice under power is neither a pure moral ideal nor a mere illusion; it is a constructed, functional, and contested product of power relations. Machiavelli reveals its dependence on political necessity, Foucault exposes its institutional construction, and critical theorists highlight its role in maintaining social order. Thus, justice must be understood as dynamic rather than static, shaped by

historical and social contexts. It operates as both a tool of governance and a site of contestation, reflecting the complexities of power in modern societies. The task of legal and political philosophy, therefore, is not to separate justice from power but to critically examine how power shapes the meaning and application of justice.

Critical Evaluation

A useful point of entry into the critical question of resistance is to consider whether justice can retain any normative independence once it is understood as a product of power. Michel Foucault appears, at first glance, to undermine the very possibility of objective justice by situating it within historically contingent power relations. His assertion that "truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint" (Foucault *Power/Knowledge* 131), suggests that justice, which relies upon truth, cannot escape these constraints. Yet, this position raises a serious objection: if justice is entirely constructed by power, does critique itself lose its foundation? Without some justice beyond power, the distinction between just and unjust risks collapsing into mere preference or strategic advantage.

This concern is forcefully addressed by Ronald Dworkin, who argues that law is not simply an instrument of power but a practice of principle. Dworkin insists that legal decisions must be justified through moral reasoning, asserting that individuals possess rights that constrain political authority (Dworkin 225). His notion of

“law as integrity” challenges the Foucauldian reduction of law to power by emphasising coherence, fairness, and respect for individual rights. Similarly, Lon L. Fuller defends the “inner morality of law,” arguing that legal systems must adhere to principles such as generality, consistency, and publicity in order to function as law (Fuller 39). These positions reveal that even within power-laden systems, there remain internal standards through which justice can be articulated and defended.

Nevertheless, a closer reading suggests that Foucault does not entirely foreclose the possibility of resistance. Rather than denying justice, he reconfigures it as a site of struggle within power relations. Power, in Foucault’s account, is not monolithic but relational, implying that where there is power, there is also the possibility of resistance (Foucault *History of Sexuality* 95). This insight allows for a reinterpretation of justice as an evolving construct shaped by contestation and critique. In this light, the contributions of Jürgen Habermas become relevant, as he locates the potential for justice in communicative rationality and public discourse (Habermas 107). While Habermas seeks to ground justice in rational consensus, Foucault would caution that such discourse is never entirely free from power. The tension between these perspectives emphasizes the complexity of the problem: justice can neither fully transcend power nor be reduced to it.

Conclusion

The analysis undertaken in this paper has demonstrated that the relationship between power and justice is far more intricate than traditional legal and political theories suggest. Rather than existing as an external standard that constrains power, justice emerges within the very structures and practices through which power is exercised. Drawing on the insights of Michel Foucault, the study has shown that legal systems function not merely as neutral arbiters but as active sites in the production of normative orders. Justice, in this sense, is historically contingent and institutionally mediated, shaped by the interplay of knowledge, discourse, and authority. In light of these findings, this paper concludes that the task of legal and political philosophy is not to detach justice from power, an endeavour that is both impractical and conceptually flawed, but to critically interrogate the conditions under which justice is produced.

References

- Agamben, Giorgio. *State of Exception*. Translated by Kevin Attell. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
- Durkheim, Émile. *The Division of Labour in Society*. Translated by W.D. Halls. New York: Free Press, 1984.
- Dworkin, Ronald. *Taking Rights Seriously*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977.
- Foucault, Michel. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. Translated

A Foucauldian Analysis of Power, Law, and the Construction of Justice

- by Alan Sheridan. New York: Vintage Books, 1977.
- . *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings*. Edited by Colin Gordon. New York: Pantheon Books, 1980.
- . *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction*. Translated by Robert Hurley. New York: Vintage Books, 1978.
- Fuller, Lon L. *The Morality of Law*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969.
- Garland, David. *Punishment and Modern Society: A Study in Social Theory*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990.
- Gramsci, Antonio. *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. Edited by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. New York: International Publishers, 1971.
- Habermas, Jürgen. *Between Facts and Norms*. Translated by William Rehg. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996.
- Hobbes, Thomas. *Leviathan*. Edited by Richard Tuck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511808166>
- Machiavelli, Niccolò. *The Prince*. Translated by Peter Bondanella. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. *The German Ideology*. New York: International Publishers, 1970.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich. *On the Genealogy of Morals*. Translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books, 1967.
- Plato. *Republic*. Translated by G.M.A. Grube. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1992.
- Rawls, John. *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971.
- Weber, Max. *Economy and Society*. Edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.